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Abstract
Th is paper explores the implications of Canada’s Immigra-
tion Minister Jason Kenney’s July 2009 comments on 
Mexican and Czech refugee claimants that accompanied 
the imposition of visas for these two countries. I argue 
that the Minister’s comments, in concert with his control 
over the tenure of Immigration and Refugee Board mem-
bers, substantiate a claim that the Board is institutionally 
biased. While allegations of institutional bias have not 
fared particularly well in Canadian courts, I contend that 
the applicability of section 7 Charter rights distinguishes 
the immigration and refugee context, and makes success 
more probable. Specifi cally, I posit that the Minister’s 
comments have opened a window of opportunity to bring 
an end to the executive’s unfettered discretion over IRB 
reappointments, since the most eff ective remedy to address 
institutional bias would be amendment of the reappoint-
ment process.
Résumé
Cet article étudie les incidences de commentaires faits par 
le ministre canadien de l’Immigration, Jason Kenney, en 
juillet 2009 au sujet des demandeurs d’asile mexicains 
et tchèques entourant l’imposition du visa pour ces deux 
pays. L’auteur soutient que les commentaires du ministre, 
de concert avec son contrôle sur la durée des mandats des 
membres de la Commission de l’immigration et du statut 
de réfugié, étayent une allégation de partialité institution-
nelle contre la Commission. Malgré l’insuccès de telles 
démarches devant les tribunaux canadiens, l’auteur sou-
tient que l’applicabilité de l’article 7 de la Charte distingue 
le contexte de l’immigration et des réfugiés et rend le suc-
cès plus probable. Plus précisément, l’auteur propose que 
les commentaires du ministre ont ouvert une « fenêtre 
d’opportunité » pour mettre un terme à la libre discrétion 
de l’exécutif sur le renouvellement des mandats des mem-
bres de la CISR, puisque le remède le plus effi  cace pour 
traiter la partialité institutionnelle serait une modifi cation 
du processus de renouvellement.
Introduction
On July 13, 2009, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship, Immigra-
tion and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, announced that 
Canada would be imposing visas on citizens from Mexico 
and the Czech Republic. Th e aim was to stem the tide of 
refugee claimants from what were respectively the number 
one and number two source countries for claims made in 
Canada. In a press release, Minister Kenney explained that 
the delay and costs associated with processing this high 
claim volume was “undermining our ability to help people 
fl eeing real persecution.”1 His implication was clear: most 
Mexican and Czech claimants were not genuine refugees.
Th e Minister’s comments to various media outlets over 
the following days confi rmed his outlook. He argued that 
“the vast majority of Mexico’s refugee claimants are eco-
nomic migrants from the middle class,”2 and that “[i]t’s 
an insult to the important concept of refugee protection 
to allow it be systematically violated by people who are 
overwhelmingly economic migrants.”3 Regarding Czech 
Roma, who represent the vast majority of claimants from 
the Czech Republic, Minister Kenney argued that they are 
free to move elsewhere in Europe and therefore are not real 
refugees.4 He also referenced an Immigration and Refugee 
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Board (IRB) fact-fi nding report which found no evidence 
of state-sponsored persecution of Czech Roma, stating, “ [i]f 
someone comes in and says the police have been beating 
the crap out of them, the IRB panelist can then go to their 
report and say, ‘Well, actually, there’s been no evidence of 
police brutality.’”5
Th ese statements were met with condemnation from both 
academic and advocacy circles. While some focused upon 
the lack of supporting evidence for the Minister’s claims,6 the 
predominant concern was a perceived encroachment upon 
IRB legislative authority. Th e Canadian Council for Refugees 
and the Refugee Lawyers’ Association of Ontario agreed 
that the comments constituted political interference with 
the independence of the IRB, which retains sole authority to 
decide individual refugee claims.7 Former IRB chairperson 
Peter Showler said, “I think [the Minister] has overstepped 
the line, and I think the courts are going to tell him that he’s 
overstepped the line.”8 Rocco Galati, a Toronto immigration 
lawyer, announced plans to bring a lawsuit on behalf of Czech 
Roma refugees, based on alleged IRB institutional bias.9
Th is paper will explore the feasibility of such a lawsuit 
and suggest a litigation strategy for presenting an argument 
that the IRB is institutionally biased. I contend that the 
Minister’s comments following the visa impositions, in con-
cert with his control over the tenure of IRB members, sub-
stantiate a claim of institutional bias. While such arguments 
have not fared particularly well in Canadian courts, I will 
argue that the applicability of rights under section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms distinguishes the 
immigration and refugee context and makes success more 
probable. Specifi cally, I posit that the Minister’s comments 
have opened a window of opportunity to bring an end to the 
executive’s unfettered discretion over IRB reappointments, 
since the most eff ective remedy to address institutional bias 
would be amendment of the reappointment process.
High Degree of Independence Required in the 
Refugee Determination Context
Th e Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides 
all divisions of the IRB with “sole and exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, includ-
ing questions of jurisdiction.”10 Th is language conveys a 
legislative intent to bestow on the Board full and unquali-
fi ed decision-making authority. Th e existence of this intent 
is further substantiated by the IRPA’s objectives, which 
include the granting of “fair consideration to those who 
come to Canada claiming persecution,”11 and the establish-
ment of “fair and effi  cient procedures that will maintain 
the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, 
while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all human beings.”12 Impartial 
decision making is central to maintaining a fair process that 
accounts for the unique situation of each claimant.
While the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held in 
Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (Liquor Control 
and Licensing Branch, General Manager) that administra-
tive tribunals, as a general rule, are not held to the level of 
independence required of the judiciary under section 11(d) 
of the Charter, McLachlin CJ acknowledged that excep-
tions may exist where Charter rights are implicated.13 In 
the refugee determination context, it has been accepted that 
IRB decision makers have the potential to exercise power 
over claimants’ section 7 rights to life, liberty, and secur-
ity of the person. Wilson J’s decision in Singh can be cited 
for the proposition that section 7 is engaged in the refugee 
determination process.14 While Wilson J’s reasons were 
endorsed by only Dickson CJ and Lamer J, the other three 
participating justices made no contrary conclusions on 
the applicability of section 7.15 Subsequent courts applying 
Singh have accepted that section 7 is engaged in the refugee 
determination process.16 It is also notable that a unanimous 
SCC later ruled in Suresh that “[t]he greater the eff ect on the 
life of the individual by the decision, the greater the need 
for procedural protections to meet the common law duty of 
fairness and the requirements of fundamental justice under 
s. 7 of the Charter.”17 In that case, the Court concluded that 
deportation of a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture 
would generally violate section 7.18
Th us, given that section 7 of the Charter is engaged in the 
refugee determination context, a more stringent standard 
of decision-maker independence is warranted. As Gerald 
Heckman and Lorne Sossin put it, “[s]urely if a party has 
the right to claim the protection of the Charter, they have 
a corresponding right to an independent and impartial 
resolution of that claim.”19 Th e Federal Court of Appeal 
endorsed this conclusion in the 2006 Kozak case. Evans CJ 
stated that “[t]he independence of the [IRB], its adjudica-
tive procedure and functions, and the fact that its decisions 
aff ect the Charter rights of claimants, indicate that the con-
tent of the duty of fairness owed by the Board, including the 
duty of impartiality, falls at the high end of the continuum 
of procedural fairness.”20 Th e IRB is therefore among those 
exceptional tribunals for which rigorous procedural fair-
ness, including the right to an independent and impartial 
decision maker, appears to be required.
Valente established three indicia of judicial independence: 
security of tenure, security of remuneration, and adminis-
trative control.21 Th ese principles were found to be applic-
able to administrative tribunals in Canadian Pacifi c Ltd. v 
Matsqui Indian Band, but Lamer CJ noted that the requisite 
level of independence is more fl exible in the administrative 
context, and depends upon “the nature of the tribunal, the 
Volume 27 Refuge Number 1
104
interests at stake, and other indices of independence such 
as oaths of offi  ce.”22 As established above, IRB members are 
to be aff orded a high degree of independence. Th us, each of 
the three indicia ought to be assured. Security of remunera-
tion and administrative control are not controversial in this 
context: security of tenure is the factor at issue.
Insuffi  cient Security of Tenure at the IRB: 
Th e Reappointments Process
IRB members are Governor-in-Council (GIC) appoin-
tees who, within any given term, may only be removed for 
cause.23 Th e IRPA provides for good behaviour terms of up 
to seven years but, following the 2007 recommendation of 
the Public Appointments Commission Secretariat, initial 
terms have consistently been set at three years.24 Regarding 
reappointment, the IRPA states that members “are eligible 
for reappointment in the same or another capacity.”25 
Th e legislation off ers no further guidelines on how the 
reappointments process is to be carried out.
Th e IRB appointment and reappointment process has 
been a subject of controversy for some time. In December 
1997, the Auditor General expressed concern with member 
recruitment methods, candidate evaluation, and reappoint-
ment recommendations.26 Th e appointments process 
was eventually amended—fi rst in 2004, and again in July 
2007—to incorporate these and other expert recommenda-
tions. Th e changes included measures to increase transpar-
ency and fairness and to ensure that appointments were 
merit-based.27
Th ough these improvements to appointment practices 
are laudable, changes to the reappointments process have 
not been on an equivalent scale. In 1997, Board members 
told the Auditor General that exemplary performance pro-
vided no guarantee of reappointment.28 In response, a new 
performance appraisal system was implemented in 1999. 
Responsibility for recommending renewals was transferred 
from a Ministerial Advisory Committee to an internal IRB 
Performance Review Committee.29 Th e Committee was 
charged with overseeing the appraisal process and provid-
ing a report to the Minister “at the end of a member’s term 
as advice on reappointment.”30 Th e Minister is not obligated 
to take the recommendation into account, but the IRB web-
site states that the reappointment process “will continue to 
refl ect a performance evaluation consistent with the merit-
based competency criteria.”31
In March 2009, the Auditor General report revealed 
that, while the performance review evaluation process 
was being carried out well, its impact was less pronounced 
than expected. A review that took place between 1 January 
2006 and 31 March 2008 found that, of the eighty-nine 
members who were recommended to the Minister by the 
Performance Review Committee, the Governor-in-Council 
reappointed thirty-seven (42 per cent). In roughly the same 
period (September 2006 to March 2008), forty-three new 
appointments were made.32 Th ese numbers are surprising, 
given the Board’s estimate that it takes between six and 
twelve months and $100,000 to fully train a new member.33 
If an existing member’s performance review is positive, why 
would the Minister choose to bear the expense of hiring 
and training a new member, rather than recommending 
reappointment? An explanation is not available, but it may 
be reasonable to infer that the performance review is not a 
determinative factor in reappointment decision making.
Concern surrounding the failure to reappoint qualifi ed 
and competent members was conveyed by a representa-
tive of the Canadian Council for Refugees in a May 2007 
report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration.34 In that same report, Jean-
Guy Fleury, the IRB chairperson at the time, and Nick 
Summers, a former member of the IRB advisory panel, both 
suggested that the Minister’s discretion over reappoint-
ments created a politicized process. Mr. Fleury was of the 
opinion that the process ought to be amended to allow the 
chairperson to control reappointments.35
Valente established that the basic requirement for secur-
ity of tenure for the purposes of section 11(d) is “a tenure, 
whether until an age of retirement, for a fi xed term, or for 
a specifi c adjudicative task, that is secure against interfer-
ence by the Executive or other appointing authority in a dis-
cretionary or arbitrary manner.”36 Th e SCC has not ruled 
clearly on the meaning of security of tenure in the admin-
istrative context,37 but existing case law suggests that the 
requirements are relatively lenient. In 2747–3174 Québec Inc. 
v Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool), a fi xed-term appoint-
ment of up to fi ve years, with reappointment decisions 
informed by a performance evaluation, was found to be 
acceptable for a liquor licensing body to which the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms applied.38 In Bell 
Canada v Canadian Telephone Employees Association, the 
chairperson’s discretionary power to extend appointments 
to the Canadian Human Rights Commission was not 
deemed to compromise independence.39
Given that IRB members enjoy fi xed terms of similar 
duration to those in Régie, with dismissal only for cause 
and discretionary reappointments, it would appear that 
the case law contradicts an argument that security of ten-
ure at the IRB is inadequate. However, in both Régie and 
Bell, section 7 Charter rights were not implicated. Régie, it 
should be acknowledged, did concern the right to a pub-
lic and fair hearing before an independent and impartial 
tribunal under section 23 of Quebec’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms.40 However, the refugee determination 
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context can be distinguished from that of liquor licensing. 
While the right of a permit holder to operate a business is 
an important economic right, refugee claimants face poten-
tial deportation to situations where their life, liberty, and 
security of the person will be denied. An argument can be 
made that, given these circumstances, the independence 
requirements for the IRB ought to be among the most strin-
gent for administrative tribunals, and closer to the standard 
required of courts, where an unwritten constitutional prin-
ciple of judicial independence applies.41
While Valente does not specify the length of a “fi xed term” 
that would be suffi  cient in the judicial context, it would cer-
tainly be more than three years. Th e standard would likely 
be much closer to that specifi ed for section 96 courts, which 
is the age of retirement. Of course, holding an adminis-
trative tribunal to the same standard as a court would be 
unreasonable given that tribunals play a diff erent societal 
function. However, for a tribunal with a court-like character 
and the potential to impinge upon section 7 Charter rights, 
the standard arguably ought to be higher than a three-year 
term with entirely discretionary possibility of reappoint-
ment. Th is context is also distinguished by the fact that 
IRB members are generally reappointed for seven-year 
terms.42 As the renewal term is substantially longer than 
the initial appointment, there is a strong incentive for mem-
bers to do whatever they perceive to be necessary to secure 
reappointment.
Institutional Bias
Th e test for institutional bias, introduced in R v Lippé, asks 
whether a well-informed person would have a reasonable 
apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases.43 
To be valid, an apprehension of bias must be “a reasonable 
one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, apply-
ing themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the 
required information.”44 In the context of administra-
tive tribunals, a more fl exible test is usually acceptable.45 
However, as detailed above, a lesser degree of fl exibility is 
warranted in this context, given the IRB’s quasi-judicial 
character and impact on Charter rights.
Th e argument that ministerial discretion over reappoint-
ments encroaches upon security of tenure may be suffi  -
cient on its own to ground a case for IRB institutional bias. 
However, the case is strengthened signifi cantly by Minister 
Kenney’s recent media comments. Th ese comments, com-
bined with ministerial discretion over the reappointments 
process, lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias in all 
refugee determination proceedings for claimants from 
Mexico and the Czech Republic. Th e logic is straight-
forward: the Minister has publicly displayed a glaring nega-
tive bias towards claimants from these two countries. Board 
members, who rely on this same Minister to be reappointed 
to their position, may very well be predisposed to reject 
Mexican and Czech claimants in order to secure minister-
ial favour and avoid potential reprisal in the form of non-
reappointment. In the words of University of Toronto law 
professor Audrey Macklin, “[t]hey might be fearful when 
their time comes up for reappointment that he will exam-
ine their acceptance rates from the countries where he 
has deemed refugee claimants to be bogus, and penalize 
them.”46 Macklin’s contention is valid: the Minister does, 
in fact, have access to data on how each individual Board 
member decides on claims originating from specifi c coun-
tries. Th e name of the presiding Board member is included 
in the reasons of each Refugee Protection Division decision, 
and these reasons are publicly available online.
Whether individual IRB members are in fact biased is 
irrelevant to the determination of a potential lawsuit. Sara 
Blake points out that a minister’s bias does not necessar-
ily imply that an adjudicator employed by his or her min-
istry is biased.47 A decision to reject a Mexican or Czech 
claim could still be made based on impartial reasoning with 
regard to the individual circumstances and a well-reasoned 
evaluation of the wider context, with no consideration of 
the Minister’s views. In fact, the Minister’s statements may 
merely have been unprofessional, but not legally problem-
atic, if IRB members were more insulated from ministerial 
infl uence. It is the combination of the comments, the dis-
cretionary reappointment process, and the signifi cance of 
the rights aff ected that substantiates a legal challenge. Th e 
appearance of fairness is as essential to maintaining the 
integrity of the refugee determination process as actual 
lack of prejudice. Th us, if a reasonable apprehension of bias 
can be established based on the Minister’s comments and 
his control over reappointments, all decisions concerning 
Mexican and Czech claims will be invalid, regardless of 
their individual quality.
In Sethi v Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal held that 
members of the antecedent refugee determination body 
who faced potential appointment to the new IRB could not 
have felt pressure to render negative decisions, as the gov-
ernment had no interest in seeing refugee claims defeated.48 
However, Judith McCormack writes that the judgment dis-
played “a certain myopia”49 and, as we now have persuasive 
evidence that Minister Kenney did, in fact, have an interest 
in stemming the tide of Mexican and Czech refugees, there 
is a strong possibility that a court would decide diff erently 
at present.
International norms and jurisprudence can be applied to 
bolster the institutional bias argument. Th e European Court 
of Human Rights, for instance, has placed more emphasis than 
Canadian courts on “guarantees against outside pressure” and 
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the appearance of independence.50 Institutional bias has also 
been argued along a similar line in the context of Australia’s 
Refugee Review Tribunal.51 If the lack of Canadian preced-
ent poses any hurdles, international jurisprudence provides 
additional justifi cation for judicial scrutiny of the Minister’s 
interference with Board decision making.
Bringing the Challenge to Court
As mentioned above, the case for IRB institutional bias does 
not hang upon Minister Kenney’s comments—the inad-
equacy of the discretionary reappointments process is suf-
fi cient on its own. However, Minister Kenney’s comments 
add signifi cant weight to an attempt to have the process 
amended. Th e best way to bring the challenge would be in 
the context of one or several refugee claim(s) from a coun-
try about which the Minister has made biased comments. 
Unfortunately, this may prove diffi  cult in the context of 
Mexican and Czech claims given that almost two years have 
now passed since the comments were made and, if insti-
tutional bias is not raised from the outset of proceedings, 
parties are not normally able to complain.52 Furthermore, 
the visa imposition has brought Mexican and Czech claims 
to a near halt. Still, the Minister has not revoked or quali-
fi ed his comments, so they can still be cited as an accurate 
expression of his views. Th us, at this stage, an argument for 
institutional bias based in part upon these comments could 
still be raised for Mexican and Czech cases at a prelimin-
ary stage. Additionally, it may be possible to bring a similar 
challenge based on the Minister’s more recent comments 
implying that asylum seekers who have arrived in Canada 
via human smugglers are queue jumpers “taking up space 
and resources in our immigration and refugee systems that 
should be focused on those who are legitimately and law-
fully waiting their turn to come to Canada.”53
Institutional bias arguments were raised in a series of 
2010 Federal Court cases involving Czech refugee claim-
ants.54 In each of these cases, the Court rejected the appli-
cant’s contention that Minister Kenney’s comments led to 
a reasonable apprehension of bias against Czech claimants. 
However, the arguments in these cases were presented in 
an incomplete manner. In Gabor, Zinn J refused to attach 
much weight to the media comments by Peter Showler, 
Audrey Macklin, and others because they were not pre-
sented in the form of sworn affi  davits and were speculative 
and unsupported.55 In Cervenakova, the applicant merely 
stated that the reappointments process contributes to a rea-
sonable apprehension of bias, and did not adduce evidence 
of “attenuated independence on the part of the Board or 
any of its members.”56 In Zupko, Snider J stated, “I have no 
evidence, beyond bare speculation, that appointments are 
made on the basis of prospective members’ views of the 
Minister’s speeches or that the renewal of Board member 
appointments is made on the basis of, or infl uenced by, their 
refugee claim acceptance rates.”57 Th us, in each of these 
cases, the institutional bias argument does not appear to 
have been presented fully and coherently, and the eviden-
tiary basis for key assertions was lacking. A more carefully 
formed argument may well fare better.
A court fi nding institutional bias would likely set aside 
a Board decision to which the bias applied and call for it to 
be reheard before a properly constituted panel. Forming a 
properly constituted panel would require legislative chan-
ges to the reappointment process, which would take time, 
and could cause nightmarish delays to an already overbur-
dened and backlogged refugee determination system. Th is 
concern is not insignifi cant—increased delays would have 
signifi cant consequences for claimants and taxpayers alike. 
However, this diffi  culty must be balanced against Canada’s 
need for a fair and unbiased refugee determination system 
that meets our human rights obligations at the national 
and international levels. Furthermore, the required chan-
ges would be relatively simple. Th e IRB already has a high-
quality performance evaluation process in place. A sound 
policy would simply require that the Minister adopt the 
Performance Review Committee recommendations in the 
absence of clear and valid reasons to do otherwise. Th e pot-
entially serious impact of delays would provide an incentive 
to the legislature to act quickly, thus ensuring that the delay 
would be minimally disruptive.
A brief comment on Bill C-11, the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act, is warranted at this stage. Th e Bill has received 
royal assent, and its reforms are due to come into eff ect 
in late 2011. Th e appointment and reappointment pro-
cesses for the new Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) are to 
remain unchanged from the current system applicable to 
IRB members. As such, it would appear that the argument 
made in this paper will remain applicable in that the RAD 
reappointments process will raise the same institutional 
bias concerns.
Conclusion
Minister Kenney’s comments on Mexican and Czech refu-
gee claimants overstepped his legislative authority and 
highlighted the Minister’s current power to compromise 
independent decision making at the IRB. Th is situation is 
worrisome given the immense importance of having a fair 
and balanced refugee determination process in place in 
Canada. I submit that the case for institutional bias is strong 
and that amendment of the IRB reappointments process is 
the proper way to remedy this issue and maintain the integ-
rity of our system. While Canadian courts have not been 
overly receptive to institutional bias arguments in other 
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contexts, the applicability of section 7 Charter rights in the 
refugee determination context makes the argument more 
persuasive. Th e time is ripe for bringing a legal challenge 
on this basis.
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